See also (wiki): model-risk-management · agentic-ai-governance · ai-vendor-contracts
⚠️ UPDATE NOTE: This file supersedes the SR 11-7 framing in sr11-7-ai-model-risk-management.md for institutions with >$30B in assets. SR 26-2 was issued April 17, 2026, jointly by the Federal Reserve, OCC (Bulletin 2026-13), and FDIC. SR 11-7 (2011) is now rescinded for in-scope institutions.
Vendor caveat: None — this is primary regulatory guidance from federal banking regulators. Credibility rating: TIER 1 — Federal Reserve Supervisory Letter SR 26-2, OCC Bulletin 2026-13, FDIC joint issuance, April 17, 2026.
Executive Summary
- SR 26-2 replaces SR 11-7 (2011) as the primary model risk management framework for US banks. Primary applicability: institutions with >$30B in total assets. Issued April 17, 2026.
- Generative AI and agentic AI are explicitly excluded from scope. The guidance states they “are novel and rapidly evolving” and “not within its scope.” A separate RFI on AI/GenAI in banking is planned.
- Six substantive changes from SR 11-7: narrower institutional scope, tighter model definition requiring all three criteria, risk-based (not annual) monitoring, permissive non-binding language, redefined validator independence, and explicit AI governance carve-out.
- The materiality framework is the key operational change: exposure + purpose determines validation depth, not a uniform annual cycle.
- For community banks (<$30B): not enforceable, won’t trigger supervisory criticism — but the OCC notes smaller banks with significant model complexity may still face informal expectations.
What Changed from SR 11-7
| Dimension | SR 11-7 (2011) | SR 26-2 (2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Applicability | All Fed/OCC/FDIC supervised institutions | Primary: >$30B assets; limited application to smaller banks |
| Model definition | Broad — captured “most quantitative tools” | Tighter — requires all three: complex quantitative method + theoretical underpinning + quantitative output |
| Validation frequency | De facto annual cycle | Materiality-driven frequency (no prescribed interval) |
| Language | Prescriptive | Permissive (“sound practice”) — non-binding |
| Validator independence | Organizational separation from development team | Review quality and objectivity over org separation |
| GenAI / Agentic AI | Not addressed (written in 2011) | Explicitly excluded — separate framework forthcoming |
| Rescinded prior guidance | N/A | Rescinds SR 11-7, SR 21-8, OCC 2011-12, 2021 BSA/AML model risk statement |
The GenAI / Agentic AI Carve-Out: What It Means
The most consequential sentence in SR 26-2 for AI practitioners: “Generative AI and agentic AI models are novel and rapidly evolving. As such, they are not within the scope of this guidance.”
What this does NOT mean:
- It does not mean generative and agentic AI are unregulated.
- It does not mean examiners will ignore GenAI risk at your institution.
- It does not mean existing enterprise risk management frameworks (operational risk, third-party risk, consumer compliance) stop applying.
What it does mean:
- There is currently no specific federal model risk supervisory framework for LLMs, RAG systems, or AI agents in banking.
- The existing SR 11-7 validation apparatus — conceptual soundness, back-testing, outcomes analysis — does not map cleanly to generative systems and regulators have acknowledged this.
- A formal Request for Information (RFI) on AI/GenAI governance in banking is expected. Until it arrives, institutions are expected to apply existing risk management principles with appropriate judgment.
The practical implication: Banks deploying GenAI face a governance vacuum at the federal MRM level. The safest interim posture is applying SR 26-2 principles (materiality, independent review, ongoing monitoring) to GenAI voluntarily, documented as internal policy, while awaiting the RFI and subsequent guidance.
Cross-reference: FINRA’s 2026 Annual Regulatory Oversight Report (Dec 2025) takes a parallel position for broker-dealers — requiring governance frameworks for GenAI but leaving specifics to firm-level policy. The regulatory posture across banking and securities is consistent: require governance, defer specifics.
The Materiality Framework
The core operational change in SR 26-2 is replacing the annual validation presumption with a materiality-driven framework. Four drivers determine model materiality:
- Inherent risk — complexity of the modeling approach, degree of judgment involved
- Exposure — financial footprint; how large is the portfolio or decision volume affected
- Purpose — decision weight; is the model the primary driver or one input among many
- Use — operational context; customer-facing vs. internal; regulatory capital vs. operational efficiency
High-materiality models get deep validation, frequent monitoring, senior sign-off. Low-materiality models get proportionate oversight. The institution sets the materiality thresholds; examiners assess whether the thresholds are reasonable and consistently applied.
For CIOs and risk officers: The materiality framework creates an opportunity to right-size validation burdens on low-risk models — but also creates an obligation to formally classify all models. Institutions that have never maintained a complete model inventory face the same first question from examiners under SR 26-2 as under SR 11-7.
What Stays the Same
The three-pillar validation framework is retained, less prescriptively:
- Conceptual soundness — sound theory, tested methodology, rigorous data quality
- Outcomes analysis — back-testing, benchmarking, sensitivity analysis
- Ongoing monitoring — performance tracking, alerts, periodic review
Third-party model governance remains the institution’s responsibility. “We bought it from a vendor” remains an insufficient defense — SR 26-2 carries forward the expectation of contractual validation rights and documented oversight.
Applicability Summary
| Institution Type | SR 26-2 Applicability |
|---|---|
| >$30B assets (Fed/OCC/FDIC regulated) | Primary scope — full expectations apply |
| <$30B assets with complex model portfolios | Limited application — not enforceable but informal expectations if model risk is significant |
| Community banks (<$30B, simple models) | Guidance available as reference; not supervisory requirement |
| Credit unions (NCUA regulated) | Not in scope — NCUA model guidance covers interest rate risk only (gap documented in GAO-25-107197) |
| Broker-dealers (FINRA regulated) | Not in scope — FINRA 2026 ROI governs separately |
Sources
| Source | Details | Tier |
|---|---|---|
| Federal Reserve SR 26-2 (Apr 17, 2026) | Joint issuance with OCC and FDIC; supersedes SR 11-7 | TIER 1 |
| OCC Bulletin 2026-13 (Apr 17, 2026) | OCC equivalent of SR 26-2; same joint guidance | TIER 1 |
| FDIC Press Release (Apr 17, 2026) | FDIC joint issuance confirmation | TIER 1 |
| GAO-25-107197 (May 2025) | Documents NCUA model risk gap | TIER 1 |
| FINRA 2026 Annual Regulatory Oversight Report (Dec 2025) | Parallel GenAI governance posture for broker-dealers | TIER 1 |